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Feelings as Evaluative Indicators
A Reply to Iuliia Pliushch
Joëlle Proust
These responses aim at clarifying various aspects and implications of my proposal
that feelings are affordance sensings. Affective quality, in the present proposal,
extends beyond the domain of primary and secondary emotions to all feelings, be-
cause it results from specific features in the dynamics of valence. Feelings do not
convey an explicit causal information about the world. Causal relations are, rather,
implicitly represented in a felt affordance through the dynamic relations between
the associated, embodied cues for location, valence and intensity and type of the
affordance.  Affordances  are  neither  perceived  nor  inferred;  they  are  “sensed”,
which is an ability distinct from belief, whose informational input is derived from
features of a perceived or interpreted situation or cognitive task. The input for an
affordance sensing can well be conceptual; it is claimed, however, that even when
a task is represented through concepts, the affordance-sensings elicited during
the task are nonconceptual and evaluative. The relevant properties in affordance-
sensings being dynamic, an interpretation of the view under discussion as being
serial is resisted. Finally, Pliushch‘s proposal for extending this theory to an in-
terpretation of the feelings involved in self-deception is discussed.
Keywords
Affective feelings | Causal information | Metacognition | Noetic feelings | Self-de-
ception | Serial vs. dynamic processes | Valence
Author
Joëlle Proust
joelle.proust@ehess.fr   
Ecole Normale Supérieure
Paris, France
Commentator
Iuliia Pliushch
pliushi@students.uni-mainz.de   
Johannes Gutenberg-Unversität
Mainz, Germany
Editors
Thomas Metzinger
metzinger@uni-mainz.de   
Johannes Gutenberg-Universität
Mainz, Germany
Jennifer M. Windt
jennifer.windt@monash.edu   
Monash University
Melbourne, Australia
1 Use of the term “affect”
One  of  the  aims  of  this  article  is  to  try  to
define  feelings  according  to  their  functional
characteristics, when seen as all-purpose com-
parators. Iuliia Pliushch claims that my use of
“affective feelings” is ambiguous, because they
seem  to  be  defined  either  as  “feelings  that
possess valence”, or as “feelings that express
emotions”. I am happy to accept the blame for
not rephrasing in my own terms the subcat-
egory of “affective feelings” discussed in emo-
tion theory. 
A similar discrepancy, however, may seem
to  be  present  between  two  passages  of  my
chapter where I do express my own view: 
As will be seen below, some feelings, how-
ever, do not express emotions, i.e., are not
affective. (Proust this collection, p. 2)
All  the feelings vary in affect in roughly
the  same  way,  because  they  all  include
valence  in  their  informational  structure.
(Proust this collection p. 20)
The discrepancy is only apparent, however, and
should disappear when the issue of valence in
its relation to affect is  properly addressed. In
emotion  theory,  the  relations  between valence
and affect,  and even the existence of  valence,
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are highly debated. With rare exceptions,1 the
question  is  ignored  by  theorists  of  somatic,
agentive, or noetic feelings.2 The proposal sum-
marized in (2), however, posits that affect will
result from valence (not the other way round).
Section 7 aims to explain why affect depends on
the dynamics of valence throughout the domain
of  feelings.  These  relations  are  modulated  by
the dynamic conditions that prevail in the con-
trast between expectancy and observation in a
given  domain.  When  observation  and  expect-
ancy coincide with a predicted temporal pattern
- with a small stake involved-, the correspond-
ing feelings should not involve affect on top of
valence. This is the case for the feelings of agen-
tive  success  that  are generated in  routine ac-
tions.  Hence (1) holds.  When you predictably
overcome a minor obstacle, you don’t feel par-
ticularly thrilled. When special dynamic condi-
tions obtain, however, (acceleration or decelera-
tion  in  the  rate  of  observed  change,  as  com-
pared with the expected rate of change), valence
will be intensely felt, in terms of vividly positive
or negative experiences. Scoring an ace in a ten-
nis game, especially if it is a rare achievement
for this player, elicits in him/her an intensive
positive affect. Dynamic variations of this kind
also apply to metacognition, where Archimedes’
“Eureka” is affect-laden, while the felt ability to
respond to a memory question in a laboratory is
not. 
Hence  there  may be  affect-laden feelings
beyond  the  domain  of  what  is  traditionally
called “emotional” or “affective feelings”. Recip-
rocally, one might suspect that in the latter do-
main,  too,  affect  only  appears  beyond
thresholds of positive or negative valence, with
colder kinds of feelings occupying the lower end
of the continuum.
2 Causal information: Explicit versus 
implicit
Iuliia Pliushch presents my view on the role of
causal relations in feeling representations as fol-
1 In particular Carver & Scheier (1990, 2001) for feelings of agent-
ive  success  or  failure,  and  Stepper &  Strack (1993)  for  noetic
feelings.
2 For an interesting philosophical discussion of the nature of valence,
see Prinz (2010), against Solomon‘s skeptical stance (2003).
lows: “Due to their non-conceptual monitoring
nature, feelings do not convey, but merely ap-
proximate  a  causal  relation  between  internal
states  and  actions”  (this  collection,  p.  2).  It
may be useful to briefly comment on this sum-
mary, in order to clarify the aim of the passage
where this question is discussed as follows:
Clearly,  FS does  not  explicitly  convey  a
causal relation between situation, somatic
markers  and subjective feeling.  It  carries
this causal relation implicitly, however, as
a consequence of the control architecture
that  produces  feelings.  In  an  emotional
control loop, a perceived affordance causes
(not: is represented as causing) its express-
ive evaluation through its specialized sens-
ory  feedback.  Emotional  awareness  ex-
presses  this  functional  relation.  (Proust
this collection, p. 11)
What  is  at  stake  is  not  the  causal  relation
between internal states and actions, but rather
the nature of  the causal  relation between,  on
the  one  hand,  the  agent’s  perceptual  belief
about an external situation (”there is a bear in
front of me”) and his/her own bodily changes
(pounding heart, trembling legs, etc.). Accord-
ing  to  cognitivists,  this  causal  relation  is  not
only  generating  a  specific  emotion,  or  in  my
terms, a given feeling, as most theories would
accept.  It  also  constitutes  in  part  the  inten-
tional content of the experience of fear, or more
generally,  of  an emotional  experience. What I
object to here is that the representational struc-
ture of feelings is not  constituted by a concep-
tual  representation of  the causal link between
an external fact and observed bodily changes.
The causal relations are, rather, implicitly rep-
resented  in  a  felt  affordance  through  the  dy-
namic relations between the associated, embod-
ied cues for location, valence and intensity and
the type of  affordance perceived. Perceiving a
bear elicits a bear-affordance (i.e., a feeling of
fear  of  this  bear).  Even though,  from an ex-
ternal viewpoint, one might say that identifying
an object as dangerous has caused a disposition
to act in the agent, from the viewpoint of the
engaged agent, no such judgment needs to be
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formed because the representation of a given af-
fordance includes the relevant “causal” informa-
tion  in  its  associative  dynamic  structure.  As
suggested by Pliushch, being evaluative, feelings
predispose to act  adaptively.  A disposition to
act, then, is associated with an affordance, and
with the bodily markers for valence and intens-
ity constituting this affordance. 
3 Phenomenology of feelings: 
Background or foreground?
Should we construe the phenomenology of feel-
ings – the presence of a bodily change – as be-
ing in the foreground or in the background of
consciousness? The article under review briefly
discusses this issue (Pliushch this collection, pp.
2-3): A feeling tends to be more explicitly felt
as  bodily  when making  a  bodily  need  salient
(feeling  tired,  feeling  a  pain  in  the  joints),
plausibly  because  its  function  is  to  motivate
bodily-directed  action.  Although  in  so-called
“affective feelings” 1 the bodily phenomenology
tends to recede to the fringe of consciousness,
there  are  cases,  as  Iuliia  Pliushch  notes  cor-
rectly, where it occupies center stage – think of
Proust’s report about his chest pain when learn-
ing that Madame de Guermantes just died. 
It  is  debatable,  however,  that  in  such
cases, the formal object of the feeling consists
merely in the bodily changes, say, in heartbeat
rate. For such states are part of an intensifying
negative affordance: the loss of a friend. The no-
tions  of  “meta-emotion”  and  “meta-feeling”,
which are used by Pliushch to discuss the amp-
lification of a feeling might be captured either
in purely dynamic terms, or in a conceptual re-
construction of the situation at hand. This in-
teresting issue, discussed in section 2.2 of Iuliia
Pliushch‘s comments, has connections with the
notion  of  how  concepts  and  feelings  interact,
and will be addressed in section 4.
4 Directedness
Iuliia  Pliushch  objects  to  my  distinction
between  perceptions  and  feelings.  The  claim
that “feelings do not have a direct sensory ac-
cess to the world”, she says, relies on a meaning
of “direct” that is not compatible with the view
defended by predictive coding theorists, where
“directness  is  an  absence  of  the  evidentiary
boundary” (Pliushch this collection, p. 5). Being
direct, then, if I understand this sentence cor-
rectly,  means  to  lack  independent  evidence
about  the  world  of  the  kind  that  perception
could bring. Although predictive coding offers a
stimulating  scheme  for  understanding  mental
function, it is open to interpretation and contro-
versy. The functional hypothesis that perceiving
and feeling are both indirect will appear highly
counter-intuitive  to  many  psychologists  and
philosophers. 
As far as my article is concerned, I have
defended the view that feelings are directly re-
lated to an opportunity, in the sense that they
represent it in an immediate way, a view that
has been defended by most affordance theorists.
This is compatible with the claim that their in-
formational pathway is derived from perception
or memory. What may appear puzzling in my
proposal is that an affordance is neither directly
perceived nor  inferred.  It  is  directly  sensed,
which requires a different kind of ability. In sec-
tion 5.1, I have proposed to distinguish associ-
ations from inferences, which is relevant to the
present discussion. The kind of trigger for feel-
ings are cues elicited in a currently active con-
text, not inferences. These cues are delivered by
sensory  perception  or  by  memory,  but  dealt
with in a separate subsystem.
5 What are the relations between 
feelings and conceptual 
representations?
The comments in section 2.2 of my reviewer’s
contribution are presented as an alternative ap-
proach to my own view, but I find myself  in
agreement with most of the claims, in particular
with the remarks on p. 6 concerning the rela-
tions between feelings and conceptual represent-
ations. The main point concerns how one’s own
goal, when acting, may influence the production
of  particular  feelings.  I  discuss  this  issue  at
length in sections 5 and 6 of the article under
review (Proust this collection), as well as in a
recent publication devoted to action representa-
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tions (Proust 2014). My position is captured by
two claims. 1) Feelings – affordance sensings -
can be, and indeed are usually triggered while
performing a task that has been defined in con-
ceptual terms. Cognitive affordances, in particu-
lar, are important relational properties that an
agent  needs  to  use  when attempting  to  solve
highly  complex  problems,  for  example  when
playing  chess  or  looking  for  a  mathematical
proof. 2) The feeling episode, however, has an
exclusively evaluative, non-conceptual content. I
am aware that these two claims may easily be
misunderstood. To disentangle the two, think of
what  agents  mean  to  do:  they  mean  to  play
chess according to the rules, or to prove a the-
orem. These goals, indeed, are conceptually rep-
resented, and depend on background beliefs and
a sensitivity to epistemic norms such as truth
and coherence, which presupposes in these par-
ticular  cases  an ability to represent  beliefs  as
beliefs.  Feelings  of  knowing,  feelings  of  being
right, and other affordance sensings are gener-
ated  while  the  agents  are  conducting  these
higher-level  forms  of  reasoning.  They  are  de-
pendent  on  the  mental  and  neural  activity
which is thereby elicited. In other words, these
feelings do not  result  from  a consideration of
the  concepts  involved,  but  from the  dynamic
features  of  the  underlying processes.  Hence,  I
would go farther than my reviewer, when she
claims  that  noetic  feelings  are  often  elicited
when concepts are automatically activated when
forming a cognitive goal: they are also elicited
when concepts are activated in a controlled way,
e.g., in the process of planning what to do.
Should  we  conclude  from this  claim  that
heuristic  processes  are  “contaminated  by  back-
ground knowledge” (Pliushch this  collection,  p.
6)? No. One should rather conclude that while
the  goal  of  a  mental  action  is  conceptually
defined, the feelings entertained while acting are
generated not by the concepts themselves, but by
the dynamic characteristics of the processes un-
derlying concept use. It is thus perfectly coherent
to conclude that feelings have their own repres-
entational format that is not itself “infected” by
concepts. A “theory of the task” is not a constitu-
ent of an affordance sensing, it is only a precondi-
tion for evaluating one’s ability in solving a task.
6 Serial versus dynamic properties of 
cognitive processes
My reviewer attributes to me a serial view of
cognitive  processes  because  I  distinguish  pre-
dictive from retrodictive evaluations of mental
actions (Pliushch this collection, pp. 7-8). I do
not think that this distinction commits me to
serialism however. In my 2013  book, I propose
that “a mind should primarily be seen as con-
sisting of a hierarchy of control-and-monitoring
loops, and their essentially dynamic interaction
with the world, rather than as constituted by
the successive states that emerge from this in-
teraction”.  Examples  of  how the  dynamics  at
lower  levels  of  representation  can  influence
higher levels, and the converse, are discussed in
chapters 11 and 12, where the case of schizo-
phrenic delusions is analyzed. Hence, I have no
problem with the view that low-level appraisal
affects higher-level appraisals: these types of in-
fluences are part of what it is to have a hier-
archy of control. This does not mean, however,
that  predictive  appraisal  and  retrodictive  ap-
praisal should be conflated: they have a differ-
ent evaluative function, and are based on differ-
ent dynamic cues. This does not mean, either,
that a concept-based judgment can easily influ-
ence  an  affordance-based  appraisal.  The  diffi-
culty  of  having  a  prolonged  strategic  control
over one’s feelings (based on what one knows, as
in the anagram experiment),  originates in the
different roles of associative cues and inferential
relations between concepts in mental activity.3 
Iuliia Pliushch is right, however, when ob-
serving that I stick to the distinction between
feelings  and  their  propositional  re-description.
From the viewpoint of action theory, this dis-
tinction corresponds to the contrast between re-
acting and acting strategically. I subscribe also
to her remarks on p. 6, according to which goal
representations  might  change  affordance-sens-
ings. The point is: how sustained is this change?
A  conceptual  re-description  tends  to  modify
one’s representation of the context, and hence
of one’s goals, which might either favor or re-
3 This point is developed in Proust (2014). A third form of action, ha-
bitual or routine action, is claimed to pertain to a second affordance-
based system with its own agentive feelings of opportunity.
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duce further elicitation of feelings (for example,
by  being  ashamed  of  having  felt  anger),  and
even inhibit the influence of feelings on action.
This is the case for the participants’ epistemic
decisions  in  phase  2  of  the  Anagram Experi-
ment discussed in the section 5.2 of the article.
Their ability to control their feelings, however,
cannot resist time pressure and/or divided at-
tention in phase 3. 
On the view that I propose, feelings can
only be sustainably modulated by having other
feelings replace them. There are both automatic
and strategic ways of enhancing one’s feelings
through other feelings (see  Proust 2014). Feel-
ings can easily be enhanced by enriching the as-
sociative representations constituting an afford-
ance.  Deliberately  suppressing  them,  or  reori-
enting  them to  new targets,  however,  is  very
difficult (as rejected lovers know all too well).
The Confucian moral practices offer a very good
example  of  a  strategic  attempt  to  train  new
moral feelings in followers (see Reber 2013). As
Rolf Reber shows in his fascinating analysis of
what he calls critical feelings, strategically redir-
ecting one’s feelings to new targets can only be
performed by manipulating the fluency of one’s
own  re-descriptions  and  conceptual  rules  for
acting morally. In other terms, the agents need
to  be  trained  until  they  entertain  feelings  of
ease of processing (i.e., feelings of fluency) when
activating target concepts and inferences, rather
than  merely  trying  to  immediately  subsume
their own initial feelings under critical concepts.
7 Self-deception and metacognition
Iuliia Pliushch finally makes an interesting sug-
gestion: when self-deception occurs, the believer
senses a metacognitive feeling of uneasiness, in-
dicating that her underlying belief-forming pro-
cess is faulty. This suggestions offers an account
of the tension that arises while forming a belief
on the basis of motivational, rather than eviden-
tial grounds. It would be wrong to interpret her
proposal as the claim that finding faulty a be-
lief, or a belief-forming process, involves an ap-
praisal  of  the content  of  the belief,  or of  the
kind of process that has been used to form it.
As I understand her, Pliushch is rather claim-
ing,  as  psychologists  and  neuroscientists  of
metacognition do, that the mind is able to de-
tect fault in the dynamical properties of the un-
derlying processes. Pliushch argues further that,
in contrast (she claims) with my own proposal,
monitoring not only occurs “before or after a
cognitive process, but also  during it”. There is
no real conflict, however, about this claim. Pres-
ence of intermediate monitoring depends on the
temporal  extension  of  the  mental  action  con-
sidered.  When  confronted  with  perceptual  or
memorial  uncertainty,  there  is  only  control-
based, mainly unconscious, intermediate monit-
oring;  intermediate  becomes  prominent,  how-
ever,  in  prolonged,  effortful  actions,  such  as
problem solving  Ackerman 2013). I agree with
Pliushch,  however,  that  representing a mental
action merely in  terms of  a  starting and end
points misrepresents the facts: it is based on a
serial view that does not fit the dynamic char-
acter of metacognition (as already discussed in
section  7  above).  The  evidence  presented  in
Proust (2013) suggests that retrospective evalu-
ation is based on the underlying dynamic of the
whole action (the rate of accumulation in favor
of a dominant response, as well as the disper-
sion of  the neural responses),  while predictive
evaluation is based on the dynamics elicited by
the command for this action, as compared with
a stored standard (the complexity of the feed-
back used is addressed in  Koriat et al. 2006).
An epistemic evaluation, however, has two func-
tions: stop the action, and encourage its contin-
ued performance, hence the role of polar valence
in motivating action, which is reflected in the
bi-partition of evaluations in two classes. This is
in close agreement with how predictive coding,
as any other theory of emotion and action, de-
scribes the facts. 
Does predictive coding offer  new insights
on  metacognition?  The  concept  of  “transition
probabilities” mentioned by Pliushch, is shared
by all theorists working on neural dynamics, as
well  by  theorists  of  recurrent  feedback;  the
concept of free-energy minimization, related to
the minimization of surprise, seems prima facie
to  be  consonant  with  Rescorla &  Wagner’s
(1972) well established model of reinforcement
learning.  There  is  an  internal  connection
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between free energy minimization and the eval-
uation of  one’s own uncertainty,  because it  is
adaptive to predict one’s chances of being un-
correct, and hence avoid surprising failures. The
concept  of  free  energy,  however,  is  no  more
equipped to provide any mechanistic account of
brain function as any other evolutionary theory.
“It is nothing more that principle of least action
applied to information theory”,  Friston recog-
nizes (Friston et al. 2012). Indeed a prominent
problem remains to be solved, concerning how
priors vary as a function of task demands and of
environmental  statistics.  Unpacking  the  prin-
ciple  across  adaptive  time-scales  and  survival
contexts is indeed a complex future goal. Ways
in  which  predictive  coding  might  enrich  the
analysis of metacognition with new descriptive,
operational tools or new functional explanations
remain, then, to be specified. 
Pliushch claims further that a first step in
the proposed metacognitive theory of self-decep-
tion consists in recognizing that metacognitive
feelings must be “extended to unconscious belief
forming processes”. If what is meant is that the
dynamic properties that elicit feelings belong to
such processes, there is universal agreement on
this  claim  (see  the  so-called  “cross-over  prin-
ciple” between unconscious heuristics and rep-
resentations  (including  beliefs)  and  conscious
feelings in  Koriat 2000). What is meant, then,
by the suggested “extension” is unclear. If what
is meant, rather, is that the feelings themselves
might be unconscious, this is a possibility that
is taken seriously in studies of metaperception
in blindsight patients (Reder &  Schunn 1996).
The very existence of such feelings complicates
the  phenomenologist’s  task.  A  second  step  is
claimed to consist in “clarifying the representa-
tional  content  of  tension”.  Although more  de-
tailed work needs to be done in order to better
understand the contrast between perceptual and
conceptual fluency, intuitivity is generally iden-
tified as a variety of what experimental psycho-
logists call “feelings of fluency”. One suggestion
is that what creates feelings of tension or dys-
fluency in self-deception is not merely the rep-
resentation that “the cognitive process violates
some  important  goal  representation”,  but
rather, that it violates an implicit heuristic of
self-consistency,  as  discussed in  Koriat (2012).
Another  suggestion  is  that  tension  has  to  do
with  the  realization  that  the  effort  initially
planned  for  a  current  task  needs  to  be  up-
graded, which is a source of anxiety (Ackerman
2013). In summary: belief-forming processes are
known  to  elicit  metacognitive  feelings.  It  re-
mains to be shown how a metacognitive analysis
of  self-deception  might  enlighten  philosophical
and epistemological views about it. Self-decep-
tion is a good test case for making the point
that conceptual-inferential processing also con-
veys non-conceptual information.
8 Serial versus dynamic properties of 
cognitive processes
As noted in the title of an article by Koriat el
al. (2006),  the  relations  between  control  and
monitoring in the production of metacognitive
feelings are very “intricate”. Iuliia Pliushch’s in-
sightful comments have initiated what I hope to
be  a  useful  clarification  of  another  aspect  of
feelings  (whether  metacognitive  or  not):  their
relations  with  propositional  thoughts.  Feelings
elicited by tasks that are conceptually charac-
terized do not become  ipso facto  conceptually
penetrable: this difficult, unintuitive claim is of-
ten misunderstood and resisted for wrong reas-
ons, which does not mean that it would resist
any reason! The objection related to serialism
was odd, given my own interest in the dynamic
properties of the mental processes as offering a
source of information that stable propositional
properties  of  mental  contents  cannot  provide.
Once prediction and post-evaluation are identi-
fied as two major functions in metacognition, it
is indeed important to emphasize that metacog-
nitive processes of each kind are dynamic, and
rely  on  various  types  of  re-afferent  feedback.
Epistemic  decisions,  however,  once  made,  are
discontinuous by design, which turns the pre-de-
cisional confidence level into a final evaluation
that triggers or inhibits the corresponding ac-
tion.  Hence,  a  contrast  must  be  maintained
between how to select a goal and determine the
level of effort needed to achieve it (i.e., a control
command),  on  the  one  hand,  and monitoring
progress  toward the  goal,  on the other  hand.
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Each form of metacognition elicits feelings. This
does not mean that the two functions need to
be  serially  executed:  for  long,  effortful  tasks,
agents need to frequently revise their level of ef-
fort  and of  success expectancy,  by monitoring
over  time  their  progress  through  associated
heuristics and feelings.
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